This paper addresses the growing involvement of foreign and private military, defense and security firms and mercenaries, particularly in the countries with the least effective control of their often remote and dangerous resource rich territories. Private military and security companies pride themselves as responses to the failure of national, regional and international public governance structures to play effective roles in maintaining peace and security. This paper shows that international law rules on regulating the use of violence of non-State actors is divided between those cases like terrorism, where the state responsibility has been laid down in mandatory terms by the Security Council. By contrast, the regulation of private military and security companies has not attracted the same kind of categorical obligations on the part of States. What we see then is how the commercialization of violence has created differing responses in international law and institutions to the violence meted out by non-State actorsbetween those defined as terrorists and are currently stringently regulated, on the one hand, and those which define themselves as providing security, order and other ancillary services, who are currently not as stringently regulated under international law.
Introduction
The commercialization of war has greatly expanded and accelerated with the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century. government in the 1990s. 3 The Sierra Leonean Truth Commission noted that these concessions had led to the 'mortgaging of the nation's assets.' 4 In addition to governments with no effective control of their territory and no armies to speak of, huge multinational corporations interested in guarding their investment, as well as nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations, are among the consumers of this private market of security provisioning and warriors. 5 While commercialization of war has thrived, the opprobrium against mercenary violence has also grown. Yet, this high level of opprobrium has not been accompanied by a correlative heightening of the attendant international legal rules to hold violators accountable. 6 That, however, has not been because due to a lack of effort to heighten the obligations of States to root out violence in the hands of private actors in all instances.
For example, the United Nations has increased the obligations of States to deal with terrorists and terrorist groups, which pose a threat to international peace and security.
However, no analogous heightening of the responsibility of States to curb the violence of other non-State actors, such as mercenaries, as well as private military and security companies has occurred. Thus, threats posed by non-State actors that are more likely to threaten powerful countries are subject to enhanced international legal scrutiny through the very real possibility of mandatory United Nations Security sanctions. This, by 3 But see Michael Grunberg, A Sierra Leone Contract: Letters to the Editor, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Aug. 28, 2001 (noting that the Contract between Executive Outcomes and Sierra Leone which ran from May 1995 to January 1997 'did not include a sharing of mining profits' and that Sierra Leone was required to only make 'purely monetary' payments). 4 The Sierra Leone contrast, is not the case for private military companies and mercenaries who largely operate in, and threaten weak and poor countries. This is due to the fact that they are often conducting their activities without nearly any similar scrutiny, such as the mandatory decisions of the Security Council. 7 In addition to exploring the foregoing theme, this paper examines the proliferation of efforts at self-regulation in the private military and security industry, and the international legal regime that applies to this group of non-State actors. I also argue that individuals who stand behind private security and companies that violate international humanitarian and human rights law can be prosecuted as accessories for complicity to such violations. 8 In effect, I argue in favor of closing the apparent gap between the high likelihood for prosecution of crimes causing violations of bodily integrity, such as killings and mutilations, versus the low likelihood for prosecution of economic actors in war who finance or provide arms to those who engage in crimes causing violations of bodily integrity.
Commercializing War and Deferring Accountability
Perhaps the most dramatic example of the commercialization of war is the hiring of the now defunct Executive Outcomes, a private military firm, by the government of Sierra 7 U.N. Charter art. 25 (which provides that "The members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter. Article 24 of the Charter gives the Security Council, the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security). Leone in 1995. 9 Overwhelmed by a rebellion led by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the Sierra Leonean government turned to Executive Outcomes. Executive
Outcomes was the second private military firm that the government hired to deal with the violent RUF rebellion, in which hundreds of thousands had been displaced, maimed or killed in one of the most brutal episodes of senseless mayhem. 10 For its efforts, Executive
Outcomes is reported to have been paid in mineral concessions, as the Sierra Leonean government was reportedly bankrupt. Within a short time of being hired, Executive
Outcomes restored some order in the country. It also reportedly deployed its 'battalionstrength force' and its huge collection of armored vehicles, combat fighter aircrafts and gun ships to eventually remove the RUF from the diamond rich fields of Sierra Leone. remote and dangerous resource rich territory. 27 In addition, this Green Paper noted, the ratio of private security guards to police is 10:1 in less developed countries as compared to a ratio of 3:1 in developed countries. 28 
International Law and Mercenaries
Article 47 of the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions defines a mercenary extremely narrowly. To be regarded a mercenary under the protocol, one has to be: specifically recruited to fight in an armed conflict in which he or she takes part in and is motivated to do so by the desire for private gain. Such a person should also be neither a national of a party to the conflict, nor resident in the territory of a party to the permissibility of mercenarism inconsistently with the prohibition of the use of force especially given that this prohibition is recognized both as jus cogens, 34 as well as a corner-stone principle of Charter of the United Nations. 35 In some recent cases, mercenaries still pose the threat of deposing governments in weak States inconsistently with current anti-mercenarism international law rules or providing arms to rebel groups that pose a threat to governments and which reign terror on citizens.
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In addition, the payment of mercenaries or private security and military companies by governments with natural or mineral resources is inconsistent with both the letter and spirit of the international legal norms on permanent sovereignty over natural resources, and the principles relating to the right to development. 37 International law is now understood to establish a right to use natural resources for national development. 49 This attitude is perhaps a reflection of their ambivalence towards the efficacy of rules of international law shaping the behavior of these firms, but it is also consistent with the view that these militarily powerful countries may view some of these private firms as contributing to, rather than undermining global security. If this is the case, then the security of rich and powerful countries arguably comes before those of poor and weaker countries. As such, threats posed by mercenarism and rogue military companies, particularly for poor countries, do not receive the same international attention and regulatory oversight as do threats to rich and powerful countries such as transcontinental terrorism does. Another reason to be skeptical of self-regulation of private military or security companies is that they often operate in countries experiencing conflict or which are under occupation. As a result, State weakness in such cases makes it unlikely that selfregulation will result in compliance with rules of international law, inadequate as these may be for regulating these firms. States, where a suit may have been brought for a violation of the law of nations.
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Blackwater USA was further immunized from suit in Iraq under the Coalition Provisional Authority's Order No. 17. 79 In addition, private security forces in Iraq were permitted to carry weapons with authorization and to use deadly force not only in self-defense, but also to defend persons who they had been contracted to defend and to prevent "lifethreatening offences against civilians." 80 Such a broad writ for the use of deadly force by non-state actors for profit has been a major moral objection to the privatization of The foregoing goes to show that private military and security companies enjoy very broad freedoms as commercial actors to enter into contractual relationships with States, without their services being explicitly subjected to international law. Given the contracts between States that need the services of private military and security companies invariably include a right to sue for breach of contract, such contracts in effect give these private actors the right to sue these States for failure to pay them for delivery of these services, even if the provision of these services and subsequent conduct violates international law. In effect, militarily weak States contracting for the services of these corporations are doubly disadvantaged. First, given their own utter governance failures, as well as the failure of multilateral or regional initiatives to help them out when they need help, they are vulnerable to domestic or regional paramilitary groups who control parts of the territory. Alternatively, these States may decide to procure the services of external military and security companies to maintain order or to perform specific functions which they are unable to perform. This resulting asymmetry between militarily weak and poor states, on the one hand, and private military security firms from the first world, on the other, gives these firms inordinately unequal power over these weak.
Emerging Rules and Norms to Regulate Private Security Companies
Regulation in the home countries where private military, security firms, mercenary groups and individuals originate is an important part of the available governance options. Clearly, the Montreux Document fills an important gap by providing a comprehensive list of international legal rules and good practices relating to the operations of military and security companies. However, it is important to note that efforts to bring the operations of multinational corporations, to conform to the best interests of the countries where they operate now date back more than a few decades. 98 The challenges being posed by military and security companies can therefore be regarded as yet another iteration in the relations between poor countries and investors from richer countries.
Conclusions
The commercialization of war through contracts between private military and security companies, on the one hand, and governments, on the other, has been shrouded in secrecy and the lack of an effective international legal framework for curbing mercenary activity.
States claim to have a right to engage in defense and security contracting without public, parliamentary or other oversight because matters of national security are necessarily non- Finally, for countries unable to provide security and military services to ward off threats to their population and resources, regional and multilateral solutions operating with the consent of the governments of such countries and under international law is a much more preferable alternative than the provision of private military force. 102 Indeed, the often cited instances of restoration of order by Executive Outcomes in places like Sierra Leone were short-lived. Such brief restorations of order that hardly deal with the underlying political, social and economic causes of the crisis that are best addressed, not by profitmotivated private companies, but through a combination of national, regional and multilateral initiatives over a sustained period of time.
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Ultimately, tougher regulatory controls through a new international legal framework and national standards while important will be ineffective without a concurrent multilateral commitment to dealing with mercenaries as decisively as with other non-State actors who wield violence.
